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JURISDICTION
This is the response to an appeal and a cross-appeal from
the Decree of Divorce entered in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 26, 1987.

The

Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g), (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. through IV.
The Statement of the Issues as presented by Plaintiff/
Appellant is accurate so far as stated, but it fails to point out
the main issue of the case.

This issue is whether the trial

court erroneously avoided the rightful award of alimony to
Defendant/Respondent after the termination of twenty-seven years
of marriage.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
30-3-5

Disposition of property—Maintenance and health care of
parties and children—Court to have continuing jurisdiction—Custody and visitation—Termination of alimony—
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may

include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
and parties.
• • . .

(3)

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent

changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
1

parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property
as is reasonable and necessary.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
78-45-3

Duty of Man,

Every man shall support his child; and he shall support
his wife when she is in need.
78-45-2(4)

Definitions,

"Child" means the son or daughter under the age of
eighteen years and a son or daughter of whatever age who is
incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient
means.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case wherein the trial court ordered the
husband to pay $650.00 per month in child support until the
parties' minor child reaches the age of twenty-five and awarded
the wife $1,00 per year alimony.

Both awards are to be reviewed

when the minor child reaches twenty-five.

The husband is appeal-

ing the amount and duration of the child support awards as well
as the award of attorney's fees.

In addition, he is appealing

the inclusion of amounts representing the estimated real estate
commission and closing costs in determining his interest in the
marital home's equity.

The wife is cross-appealing the alimony

provisions.
This was a twenty-seven year marriage, (Record p.25.) in
which Mrs. Asper worked during the first couple of years to
2

assist her husband in earning his masters degree in engineering.
(.Id.) While Mrs. Asper has worked throughout her marriage, she
has never received any formal education and is not qualified for
anything but unskilled employment. (3^3.)

She is currently

working for her brother, and her net income is approximately
$1,100.00 per month. (Record p.66.)

Her expenses are $2,095.00

per month. (Record p. 22, 11. 11 through 14.)

On the other hand,

Mr. Asper earns a gross monthly salary of $3,326.27. (Record p.
66.)

His net income is $2,400.00 per month, (Record p. 144, 11.

2-7), with the inclusion of the amounts Mr. Asper has voluntarily
authorized be directed to a savings account. (Record p. 141,
1. 20 through p. 142, 1. 5.)
In addition to her lack of training and formal education,
Ane Asper is only able to work part time due to the special needs
of her minor daughter, Connie. (Record p. 25, 11. 22-24.)

Connie

Asper, a seventeen year old child of the parties, is inflicted
with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis resulting in significant
deformity and limited mobility.

She is incapable of gainful

employment without further education in specialized job skills.
(Record p. 8, 11. 15 through 23.)
During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the parties
stipulated through counsel (Mr. Asper's first attorney) to
temporary support and therefore no order was issued.

Mr. Asper

agreed to pay $250.00 per month temporary child support and also
to make the $330.00 per month mortgage payment on the parties'
home.

(Record p. 143, 11. 10-13.)
3

Later, Mr. Asper unilaterally

decided to discontinue making these payments, and as a result,
Mrs. Asper's counsel requested and received an order that any
alimony and child support be retroactive to September 16.
(Record p. 143, 11. 10-20.)
The parties came before the Honorable David B. Dee on two
separate occasions—September 16, 1986 and November 20, 1986.

At

these hearings, the court only received evidence proffered by way
of stipulation of the parties, and as a result, there was no
testimony taken other than to establish grounds for the divorce.
Mrs. Asper contended that she needed $700.00 per month from Mr.
Asper in order to maintain a decent standard of living for
herself and her daughter.
1. 5.)

(Record p. 144, 1. 25 through p. 145,

She requested $350.00 per month in alimony and $350.00

per month child support.

(Record p. 128, 1. 2.)

Although

recognizing the financial needs of Mrs. Asper, the court expressed
concern that if alimony were awarded, it would go on forever.
For example, the court stated:
The Court:

You're talking—you're talking
me to a position where you're
talking about alimony. And
that's why I said because of
this position your client is
taking, alimony goes on
forever.

The Court:

The Supreme Court doesn't let
us do what we used to do.
Unless we can find some way to
go around what they ruled,
alimony is given to somebody
for five years, say until this
child is 18 or 21, five years
4

would be 22, and then
because the situation
adjusted so the child
an adult. It goes on

The Court:

ceases,
has been
is now
forever—

--unless she gets remarried.
And that's because Justice
Durham thinks women have had
the short end of this so many
years it's time to get even.
So when you start tampering
with alimony, you're talking
about a forever proposition.
It never ends. When your
client is 99, your client will
still be paying alimony. If
you get into that box, you're
still in it. That's what I
said to you when we were
talking informally, out of the
presence of your clients,
otherwise you'll have a
problem that will last forever.
And she doesn't mind.

(Record p. 132, 1. 14 through p. 133, 1. 11.)

At the conclusion

of the two days of hearings, the court took the matter under
advisement.

(Record p. 149, 1. 22 through p. 150, 1. 12.)

Thereafter, Mr. Asper was ordered to pay $650.00 per month child
support and $1.00 per year alimony.

(Record p. 79.)

In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Asper the parties' home
subject to the mortgage which she must assume and pay.
p. 82.)

(Record

Mr. Asper was awarded a lien on the property for one-half

of the equity in the home as of the date of the divorce after
allowance was made for payment of estimated real estate commissions and closing costs. (]j3.)
to occur of the following:

This equity is due upon the first

sale of the home, Mrs. Asper's
5

remarriage, or when the parties' minor child reaches the age of
twenty-five years.

(Id.)

In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Asper $6,000.00 in
attorney's fees.

(Record p. 83.)

This sum was the result of the

time and effort required by Mrs. Asper's counsel due to Mr.
Asper's employment of three separate attorneys prior to trial.
(Record p. 138, 11. 16-23.)

Evidence was presented by affidavit

as to the reasonableness of the amounts charged as well as the
amount of time required.

(Record p. 140, 11. 12-19.)

At no time

did Mr. Asper's attorney object to either.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
The trial court did consider sufficient evidence and did
make detailed findings of facts as to the parties' minor child's
physical disabilities and inability to support herself after the
age of majority.
II.
At all times material herein, the parties agreed to equally
divide the equity in the marital home at the time of the divorce,
and Mr. Asper agreed to accept a lien for this amount.

The

inclusion of the real estate commission and closing costs in
determining the value of the lien was within the sound discretion
of the trial court.

Mr. Asper cannot now request the parties'

marital home be appraised at the time of sale to determine his
one-half interest.

6

III.
The award of attorneyfs fees to Mrs. Asper was correctly
based on her financial need in defending this action, and they
are reasonable under the circumstances surrounding this case.
IV.
With regard to the cross-appeal, this was a twenty-seven
year marriage wherein Mrs. Asper worked to help her husband
obtain his master's degree in engineering.

She, however, has no

formal training and is only qualified for unskilled employment.
In awarding $650.00 per month child support, the trial court
showed it recognized the overall financial needs of Mrs. Asper
(her proffer was $700.00 per month), but the classification of
the entire sum as child support was a result of the court's
efforts to protect Mr. Asper from what the court erroneously
perceived was the permanence of alimony.

Mr. Asper should be

required to pay $350.00 per month child support to be reviewed
when the parties' minor child reaches a specified age, and
$350.00 per month alimony.
V.
As Mr. Asper's arguments on appeal are without merit, and
his position has required Mrs. Asper to cross-appeal the division
of the total award between child support and alimony, Mrs. Asper
is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs associated with this appeal.

7

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACTS SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT
AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS TO AGE TWENTY-FIVE.
A trial court has broad equitable authority to order support
for a child over eighteen years of age who cannot earn a living
and is without sufficient means of self support.

The Uniform

Civil Liability for Support Act requires every man to support his
child in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987), and defines "child" as
"a son or daughter under the age of eighteen years and a son or
daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(4).

As summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Garrand v. Garrand,
615 P.2d 422 (Utah 1980), this code section:
[E]xpressly fixes responsibility for support
of a child (of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means) upon his parents. . . .
[T]his court has recognized that when a child
is so limited, either physically or mentally,
that he is unable to support himself when he
reaches his age of majority, his parents may
be required to provide support beyond that
time. Td. at 423 (footnotes omitted).
In addition, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953), the
court has broad equitable powers in "safeguarding the interest
and welfare of children."
1976) .

Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah

In the case presently before this court, Appellee, Ann

Asper, concurs with Alfred Asper in that, because the court's
authority is discretionary, there must be specific findings of
8

special or unusual circumstances justifying such an award beyond
the age of majority.

Indeed, support awarded beyond the age of

twenty-one has been reversed for failure of the trial court to
make such specified findings.

See, Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d

435 (Utah 1978); and Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah
1978) .
However, contrary to Alfred Asper's contentions, Judge David
B. Dee did make the requisite findings of special or unusual
circumstances, and these were based upon adequate evidence before
the court.

The trial court accepted into evidence a letter

outlining Dr. John Ward's professional opinion of Connie Asper!s
physical ability to support herself, and Mr. Asper did not object
to the admission of this letter in lieu of Dr. Ward's testimony
at the hearing.

(Record p. 127, 11. 15 thru 18.).

Dr. Ward is a

professor of medicine at the University of Utah and is Chief of
the Division of Rheumatology.

He has been involved in the

treatment of Connie's condition since 1974.
detailed outline of Connie's condition.

This letter is a

In pertinent part it

reads:
Connie Lynne Asper is a 16 year-old student
who I have followed since 1974 for juvenile
rheumatoid arthritis. Connie continues to
have evidence of chronic active arthritis
with significant deformity, she has involvement of hands with incomplete fist formation,
wrists with limited mobility, reduction of
shoulder motion, very limited cervical spine
[neck] motion with essentially no ability to
extend the neck and rotation limited to 30
degrees, limited extension of the hips,
limited mobility of knees, swelling and
9

tenderness of the ankles, and forefoot
deformity.
While Connie is capable of self-care and
usual activities, it is unlikely that she can
be competitively employed in the current job
market. Her physical disabilities would
limit her to a very sedentary position and
stamina and dexterity would be sincerely
limited. Therefore, it is my opinion that
Connie should be considered permanently
disabled pending such time that she is able
to gain specific job skills through an
educational process which will prepare her
for competition in the job market.
Based upon this expert opinion by a doctor personally
involved in treating Connie for over twelve years, Judge David B.
Dee made the following statements in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
3.
The parties to this action are the
parents of three (3) children, one of whom is
under the age of majority, Connie Lynne
Asper, a female, age 17, born September 19,
1969, and who currently resides with Defendant.
Since 1974, Connie has been and is now
afflicted with juvenile rheumatoid arthritis,
with significant deformity of hands, fists,
wrists and feet, and with limited mobility of
shoulder, neck, hips and knees and, as such,
the Court finds that she is permanently
disabled and is not able to be competitively
employed in the current job market, and
Connie should be considered permanently
disabled pending such time that she is able
to gain specific job skills.
4.
Plaintiff earns a gross monthly salary
of $3,326.27, and should pay $650.00 per
month child support to Defendant for the
benefit of Connie, who has special needs,
until she reaches the age of twenty-five
(25), with the first payment to be made on
September 16, 1986, and like payments on the
15th day of each month thereafter.
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Therefore, evidence was considered by the trial court and findings
of special circumstances duly noted.

In addition, while the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law expressly provide for
review of this award when Connie reaches age twenty-five, Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1953), provides for the court's continuing
jurisdiction to modify child support awards at any time.

There-

fore, should Connie become self-sufficient and able to earn a
living prior to her twenty-fifth birthday, the support award can
be modified at that time.

As a result, the award of child

support to Connie Asper until she reaches the age of twenty-five
was not an abuse of discretion and should be upheld on appeal.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CALCULATING
THE EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME.
Mr. Asper's argument in appealing the award of equity in the
marital home is confusing.

He begins by claiming as error the

inclusion of one-half of the estimated real estate commissions
and closing costs in the determination of his interest in the
equity.

Mr. Asper then concludes with a request that the Decree

be amended to award him one-half of the actual sale price of the
home.

However, the inclusion of the commissions and closing

costs is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court
did not abuse its discretion in this case.

In addition, at no

time prior to this appeal has Mr. Asper requested one-half of the
sale price of the home.

Because claims not raised at trial

cannot be considered on appeal, Mr. Asper cannot now raise this
issue.
11

At all times material herein, the parties agreed to divide
equally at the time of trial the equity in their home.

The

parties also agreed that Mr. Asper would receive an equitable
lien representing his one-half share.

First, the complaint filed

by Mr. Asper only requested the following:
10. The parties acquired a home and lot
located [at] 1332 Colonial Drive, Salt Lake
City, Utah. Defendant should be awarded the
use and possession of said home subject to an
equitable lien in Plaintiff to be paid upon
the happening of the following triggering
events: Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation with a man not her spouse; upon the
youngest child reaching the age of 18;
Defendant's ceasing to use the property as
her primary residence; sale of the property.
In the event of Defendant's death, said home
should be awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant
should also hold Plaintiff harmless from any
and all indebtedness owing on said property.
(Record p. 3-4 (emphasis added).)

Then, at trial, Mr. Asper

repeated his offer and a request for a present valuation of the
equity in the home.
MR. GUYON:

His counsel stated:
. . . Essentially Mr. Asper's
interest in the home would be
determined right at the
present time in the form of a
lien which would be payable
upon any contingencies of
course the Court wants to
impose.

(Record p. 131, 11. 4-8 (emphasis added).)

The final division of

the possession and equity of the marital home reflected Mr.
Asper's requests and position at trial.
Defendant should be awarded the home, subject
to the mortgage which Defendant should pay as
the same becomes due, and Plaintiff should
have a lien against the property for one-half
12

of the equity, after allowance for payment of
real estate commissions and closing costs
calculated at 8 % of the present value of the
home, or a lien in the amount of $35,214.50
for his share of the equity. Plaintiff's
equity shall be due upon whichever of the
following events first occurs: sale of the
home, Defendant's remarriage, or when Connie
reaches the age of twenty-five years.
Plaintiff's lien shall not bear interest.
(Record p. 70 (emphasis added).)

This final disposition of the

equity is consistent with Mr. Asper's position throughout the
proceedings.

At no time did he request the house be valued at

the time of sale, and he cannot now raise this issue on appeal.
As reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Poulton,
653 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), "It is axiomatic that defenses and
claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal."

Ij3. at 102.

Therefore, Mr. Asper cannot request one-half of the sale
price of the parties' marital home.

In addition, the trial court

did not err in calculating the amount of Mr. Asper's lien.

As

the parties agreed to evenly divide the equity subject to mortgage
payments made by Mrs. Asper, fairness requires that the parties
both assume one-half of the financial obligations upon sale of
the home.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in calculating

the parties' respective interests in the marital home, and its
decision should be upheld on appeal.

13

POINT III
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD
MRS. ASPER $6,000.00 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Courts have the authority, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-3 (1953) to award sums so as "to enable such party to
prosecute or defend the action."

There are threshold require-

ments for such an award, and these were outlined by the Utah
Supreme Court in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984).

There

the court stated:
In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees
must be supported by evidence which shows
that the requested award is reasonable.
Relevant factors of reasonableness include
'the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged
in light of the difficulty of the case and
the result accomplished, and the rates
commonly charged for divorce actions in the
community.' Also, the party requesting the
award must show financial need. Where
reasonableness of the award or financial need
have not been shown, we have reversed awards
of attorney's fees.
Id. at 864 (citation omitted).

Therefore, there are two basic

requirements necessary for an award of attorney's fees: (1)
Reasonableness, and (2) financial need.
have been met in the present case.
J. Gustin,

Both of these factors

Mrs. Asper's counsel, Frank

submitted an affidavit as to the activities undertaken

on behalf of Mrs. Asper.

These included document preparation,

client conferences and hearings. The rates charged were equal to
those commonly charged for divorce cases in Salt Lake City, Utah,
by attorneys with equal experience and expertice.

Extra hours

were required in this case due to Mr. Asper's need to employ
14

three different attorneys prior to trial.

Mrs. Asper was in no

way responsible for these circumstances but has incurred detriment
as a direct result thereof.

To compensate for this unusual

factor, Mrs. Asper1s counsel suggested that the amount of attorney's fees be paid out at the time the house is sold and the
equity divided.

(Record p. 145, 11. 6 thru 21.)

Finally, evidence was presented that Mrs. Asperfs monthly
net income, at $1,100.00, (Record p. 144, 1. 25) was insufficient
to meet her monthly expenses of $2,095.00. (Record p. 141, 11. 11
thru 14.)

On the other hand, Mr. Asper earns a gross monthly

salary of $3,326.27.

While his statement of expenses was chal-

lenged as inflated by Mrs. Asper at the hearing, (Record p. 142,
1. 11 through p. 25, 1. 11), he is at least comfortably able to
meet his expenses.

As a result, Mrs. Asper did establish the

requirements of reasonableness and financial need, and, therefore,
it was not an abuse of discretion to award her attorney's fees to
assist her in defending the action brought by Mr. Asper.
CROSS-APPEAL
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO AWARD ALIMONY TO MRS. ASPER.
Alimony is awarded in an effort to, as nearly as possible,
maintain the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the
marriage.

The court must consider all relevant factors affecting

one spouse's ability to provide for herself and the other's
ability to pay support.

As summarized by the Utah Supreme Court
15

in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985):
An alimony award should, as far as possible,
equalize the parties1 respective standards
of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage. In determining
the amount of alimony to be awarded, it was
necessary for the trial court to consider the
financial condition and needs of the plaintiff,
her ability to produce a sufficient income
for herself, and the ability of the defendant
to provide support.
Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted).

Pursuant to this standard, the

lower court abused its discretion in failing to award alimony to
Mrs. Asper.
Evidence was provided through documentation and at the
hearing to show Mrs. Asper!s need for additional support and Mr.
Asper's ability to so provide.

Mrs. Asper currently works thirty

hours per week and makes $1,100.00 per month.
$2,095.00 per month.

Her expenses total

She is unable to work full time due to the

care required by her daughter Connie who has juvenile rheumatoid
arthritis.

(Record p. 25, 11. 22-24.)

Mr. Asper earns a gross

monthly salary of $3,326.00, and his net income is $2,400.00
(Record p. 138, 11. 10-12) with the inclusion of amounts Mr.
Asper has chosen to divert to savings for his pension fund.
(Record p. 141, 11. 20-23.)
as inflated by Mrs. Asper.

His claimed expenses were disputed
(Record p. 142, 1. 11 through p. 144,

1. 1.)
Based on these figures, Mrs. Asper requested $350.00 in
child support (Record p. 128, 1. 2) and $350.00 in alimony for a
total award of $700.00. (Record p. 144, 11. 2-4.)
16

Instead, Judge

Dee decided to award $650.00 in child support for Connie to the
age of twenty-five.

This award shows that while recognizing Mrs.

Asper's overall financial needs, the court was reluctant to award
alimony.

Statements by the court suggest this decision was the

result of the court's effort to avoid what it perceived was the
permanency of alimony. At the hearing, the court expressed
concern about its erroneous assumption that an alimony award goes
on forever:
THE COURT: . . . But I think the law in the
State of Utah is if you award alimony, and
I'm not talking about special circumstances,
and this is a special circumstance with a
disabled child, you never get off of it. It
doesn't matter what you think about it.
That's the position I'm going to take in this
case.
. . . .

THE COURT: So if you talk about alimony,
you're talking about forever.
(Record p. 133, 11. 17-25.)

Mrs. Asper respectfully points out

that this is not a correct summary of the law.

Instead, under

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, an award of alimony for an unspecified
period of time continues until automatically terminated by
remarriage or co-habitation.

In addition, under Utah Code Ann.

§ 30-3-5(3) (1953), the court retains jurisdiction to modify an
alimony award when there has been a material change of circumstances.

As a result, a party is never permanently locked into

paying alimony.

In this case, it appears from the record that

the court's misconstruction of alimony law led him to fashion the
unique child support and alimony award of $650.00 per month and
17

$1.00 per year respectively.

This decision was an abuse of

discretion in light of Mrs. Asperfs circumstances.
exceed her income by $995.00.

Her expenses

She cannot work more hours as she

must help Connie with the ordinary function of day-to-day living.
In addition, this was a twenty-seven year marriage.

When the

parties were first married, Mrs. Asper worked to help Mr. Asper
get his masterfs degree in engineering.

While she continued to

work throughout her marriage, she does not have any formal
education; and, therefore, she is only qualified for unskilled
employment.
The failure to award extended alimony in a similar situation
was held to be an abuse of discretion in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d
564, (Utah 1985). In Olson, the parties had been married for
twenty-three years and had six children, three of whom were
minors.

Mrs. Olson had no formal education and had no work

experience.

The court awarded her $1,600.00 per month alimony

for a period of two years.

On review, the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
We agree, however, with the plaintiff's
contention that the court's order that
alimony terminate after two years was a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. As we
stated in Jones v. Jones, '[t]his is simply
not the sort of situation in which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony award is appropriate. ' Married soon after graduation from
high school, the plaintiff's primary occupation during the twenty-odd year marriage, was
caring for the parties' home and six children.
Having worked only minor clerical jobs for
two brief periods over twenty years apart,
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she has no reasonable expectation of obtaining
employment two years hence that will enable
her to support herself at a standard of
living even approaching that which she had
during the marriage. Continuing spousal
maintenance is mandated by these circumstances. Therefore, under our discretionary
power to modify the final decree in a divorce
action, we hereby modify the decree of
divorce in this case to provide for permanent
alimony from defendant to plaintiff. Against
should the circumstances change in the
future, the defendant may petition the court
to modify the decree under its continuing
jurisdiction.
704 P.2d at 567 (emphasis added).
case now before this Court.

Olson is applicable to the

While Mrs. Asper does have work

experience, she does not have a formal education so as to get a
job in order to maintain her accustomed standard of living or
even to meet her monthly expenses.

Further, unlike Mrs. Olson,

she has a daughter who needs extra time and attention, thus
precluding many job opportunities.

Therefore, given all of the

circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to fail
to award alimony to Mrs. Asper.
This Court has the authority to determine and award a
substitute remedy for that of the trial court's.

Pursuant to

Rule 30(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals this Court
is empowered to modify any judgment or order from which a party
appeals.

In Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982) the

Utah Supreme Court discussed the nature of their authority to
modify judgments:
It is the duty and preogative of this Court
in equity matters, where the occasion warrants,
and after a review of both the facts and the
19

law, to
for the
court's
prevent
Id. at 1019.

fashion its own remedy as a substitute
judgment of the trial court, but that
actions should only be disturbed to
manifest injustice.

In view of the practical implications resulting

from the labels given to support awards, and under the facts in
this case, Mrs. Asper requests the court to modify the trial
court's total financial award and order Mr. Asper to pay $350.00
per month child support and $350.00 per month alimony.

This

division would be consistent with Mrs. Asper's overall financial
need as well as the total support award ordered by the trial
court.
POINT V
RESPONDENT ANE ASPER IS ENTITLED TO
AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL.
Mr. Asper's appeal of the trial court's decision on the
awards of child support to age twenty-five, the equity in the
marital home and attorney's fees is without merit.

In addition,

it was clear that the trial court recognized the overall financial
need of Mrs. Asper to be in the range of $700.00 as requested by
her at trial.

Therefore, Mr. Asper's appeal of the total finan-

cial award is also without merit.

To defend against the allega-

tion that the court award of child support was excessive, Mrs.
Asper was pressed to cross-appeal the alimony provisions and
request this court to modify the division of the total award
between child support and alimony.

Therefore, Mrs. Asper requests

this court to award her attorney's fees associated with this
20

appeal.

As the Utah Supreme Court concluded in Carter v. Carter,

584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978) :
However, the defendant argues that inasmuch
as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide by
the trial court's judgment, and that she has
been put to the necessity of defending this
appeal, the plaintiff should have to bear the
costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's
fees for her counsel. We agree with the
reasonableness and propriety of her request.
Id. at 906 (footnote omitted). (See also, Ehninger v. Ehninger,
569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977) .)
In this case, Mrs. Asper has an income of $1,100.00 per
month, $995.00 less than her monthly expenses.
approximately $2,400.00 per month.

Mr. Asper nets

The trial court recognized

the appropriateness of a total financial award to Mrs. Asper of
$650.00 per month.

As a result, fairness requires that Mrs.

Asper not be required to deplete her limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is without merit.

Therefore, Mrs. Asper

requests this court to remand to the trial court for determination
of an award of her attorney's fees and costs associated with this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
This started out as a simple divorce case.

The parties were

married for twenty-seven years and have a minor child who is
disabled by arthritis.

Mrs. Asper helped her husband obtain his

master's degree, and as a result Mr. Asper nets $2,400.00 per
month by way of income as an engineer at Hill Air Force Base.
Mrs. Asper has no formal education, and she currently works for
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her brother.

Her net income is $1,100.00 per month, and her

expenses are $2,095.00 per month.

The court found and concluded

that Mrs. Asper needs $650.00 per month support from her husband.
While the facts are straightforward, the case has not been;
and Mrs. Asper requests this Court to put an end to the
unwarranted time, money and energy devoted to it as a result of
Mr. Asperfs efforts to avoid his financial responsibilities.
Prior to trial, Mr. Asper employed three separate attorneys in
this effort, thus hampering consistency and causing increased
legal fees for Mrs. Asper.

The trial court's legal miscon-

ceptions led to a convoluted division of support award between
child support and alimony even though the overall financial award
was reasonable in view of the needs of Mrs. Asper and her disabled
minor daughter who turned eighteen on September 19, 1987.
This Court should modify the total financial award to
provide for $350.00 per month in child support to be reviewed as
provided by the trial court when Connie reaches the age of
twenty-five years and to award her $350.00 per month in alimony.
In addition, Mrs. Asper requests that this Court affirm the trial
court on all other issues and award her the attorney's fees
incurred herewith.
/ ^
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